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Abstract : Competition and cooperation in polygynous households have both been widely documented across various 
disciplines. There is contradictory evidence as to whether these interpersonal dynamics produce better or worse 
outcomes for the household. This study uses a competitiveness game and a series of dictator games to measure 
competition and cooperation within households and between marriage types. Results show that there are key 
differences between monogamy and polygyny. Monogamous women compete less with their husbands than stranger 
and less in comparison to polygynous women. Monogamous spouses are more likely to forgo economic opportunities 
than polygynous spouses and have a greater preference for egalitarian resource allocations. Poly spouses maximize 
resources more often, even if it leads to disadvantageous intra-household inequality. Co-wife rivalry is rife: Junior 
wives compete more with senior wives than any other opponent, and both show high levels of spite and selfishness 
with respect to their co-wife. Education and wealth related variables mitigate the variation in behavior between the 
marriage types and sexes, suggesting that larger socioeconomic factors are just as important in outcomes for 
households. 
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1. Introduction  
Polygyny is the practice of one man marrying multiple wives. It is a widespread and 
common practice throughout the “polygyny belt”, an area that spans across the width of the 
African continent. Today, between 20-55% of women in this part of the world are in polygynous 
marriages and it is now estimated that 1 in every 4 women in the African continent are in 
polygynous marriages (Dalton & Leung, 2011; Arthi & Fenske, 2018). Most practitioners of 
polygyny are Muslim, as it is permitted under certain circumstances by Islam, but some across 
the region identify as Christian or practice a blend of spiritual traditions. In Sierra Leone, the 
country of interest in this study, polygyny is most frequently associated with Islam. On average, 
37% of women are in polygynous marriages in Sierra Leone, with greater concentration in the 
northern province and rural areas.  20% of Sierra Leonean men between the ages 15-59 have two 
or more wives (DHS, 2013).  
The slave trade and colonialism greatly impacted the population composition and the 
evolution of many cultural practices across the African continent. Although the exact origins of 
polygyny are unknown beyond general tribal culture, perhaps related to agricultural practices, 
research shows that the trans-Atlantic slave trade caused a broad expansion of the practice 
(Boserup, 1970). A larger proportion of men were victims of the slavery which lead to extremely 
skewed sex ratios (Leung & Dalton, 2011). The practice of polygyny grew as a result. Studies 
show that ethnic groups that were subjected to the slave trade are more likely to be polygynous, 
which explains why polygyny is more common in West Africa than all other regions (Fenske, 
2015; Leung & Dalton 2011).  
Existing research shows a strong link between a number of negative development 
outcomes and polygyny. Polygyny in Sierra Leone correlates with low levels of education and 
lower wealth quintiles (DHS, 2013). Most consequential are vulnerability to sexually transmitted 
infections, increased fertility, food insecurity, poor child health, early marriage of girls, reduced 
investment in female human capital, and more domestic violence (Heath et al, 2018; Rossi, 2018; 
Bove and Valeggia 2009; Edlund and Lagerlöf, 2006; Tertilt, 2003). There are also costs specific 
to men: in many parts of the world where polygyny prevails, the distended bride-price leads to 
marriage market obstruction for large numbers of men, often younger and poorer, who turn to 
crime, violence and political agitation in the absence of marriage prospects (Hudson and Matfess, 
2017). Men also face a trade-off between investing in physical assets or investing in marriage 
which leads to the crowding out of investment that may have otherwise provided personal income 
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growth and greater economic security. Each of these factors alone can result in worse 
development outcomes or lead to greater suffering. Combined they help explain why the 
polygynous practicing societies in Africa experience higher rates of poverty (Tertilt, 2005).  
Not only do polygynous households generally fare worse on economic, female welfare, 
and child health indicators, but competition appears to exacerbate the problem (Bove and 
Valeggia 2009; Omariba and Boyle, 2007; Tertilt, 2005; Strassman, 1997). It has been observed 
that men rarely treat wives equally, often pitting wives against each other for the purposes of 
ego inflation and to thwart conspiracy (Madhavan, 2002). Co-wife conflict is believed to be one 
of the prominent mechanisms that corrodes welfare outcomes for women and their children in 
polygyny. Senior wives strive to maintain their status within the household as new wives enter 
while junior wives have to carve out their place. Where resources are more scarce or where 
women are more dependent on resources from their spouses, poly women will have to vie for 
their household status, duties, and resource allocation. Less social power in society and within 
the household leads to grave resource dilution for poly women and their children (Kazianga and 
Klonner, 2006).  
Among so many reports of conflict in polygynous households, this study seeks to 
determine the extent to which members in polygynous nodes compete with each other to 
maximize personal gains, and extent to which they cooperate with one another to maximize gains 
for the household. The existing literature on polygyny lacks concrete, empirical measures of 
competition and cooperation within households. This study produces empirical measures to 
quantify these behaviors between spouses and cowives in polygynous and monogamous 
households. We use two behavioral experiments and a survey conducted in the field in Sierra 
Leone. Data is collected for polygynous and monogamous households. Games are conducted with 
respect to a subject’s spouse (first and second wife for polygynous men), co-wife (for polygynous 
women), and a stranger. Two counterfactuals are present in this research: the actions of 
monogamous households and actions towards a stranger. Monogamous household data will 
expose differences in the marriage types, and actions towards a stranger will provide a baseline 
for measurement for each marriage type. Linking game outcomes with household data reveals 
the predictive power of competitive and cooperative dynamics for the well-being of adults, their 
children, and the household unit. 
Our analysis shows that polygynous spouses (husbands and wives) choose the resource 
maximizing option more frequently than monogamous subjects, refuting the oft-touted narrative 
 4 
that monogamous households are more efficient. In stark contrast to the efficiency achieved 
between polygynous spouses, we find that polygynous women deliberately impair their co-wives, 
often to the point of self-sabotage. Mono subjects have a higher preference for equal allocations, 
but such inclinations result in fewer total resources for the household. While mono men, poly 
men, and poly women each compete equally with their spouse and a stranger, mono women 
compete significantly less with their spouse. Mono women are also more likely to select the less 
advantageous monetary allocations than other groups. Poly men display no favoritism towards 
their first or second wives. In general, male subjects exhibit more similar behavior than female 
subjects. Our estimates show that there is no singular and consistent polygyny effect throughout 
the games, and that behavior is determined by marriage type and gender interacted with other 
socio-economic conditions.  
2. Literature Review  
 This review explores the connections between competitive and cooperative behavior and   
gender and marriage structure. Although many disciplines have investigated behavior within the 
marriage types, this review primarily highlights the influential theories within the economics 
discipline. The review starts with a discussion of gender and competitiveness, then details the 
unique form of competition in the polygynous context. It gives a brief summary of evolutionary 
theories of polygyny and then finishes by relating interpersonal dynamics to theories of efficiency 
within economic household models.  
2.1 Female Competition 
Competition in the polygynous context almost exclusively refers to competition between 
co-wives. Female strategies and motivations for competition and cooperation are at play in a 
household where two or more women are sharing limited resources. For this reason, it is useful 
to understand female modes of competition. Previous studies in economics have found a 
significant gender gap in willingness to compete between men and women, suggesting that 
women are less competitive or that they lack competitive traits that might secure more power, 
prestige, and resources (Buser et al., 2014).  
Experiments that clarify the differences in competition along gender lines show that 
women are indeed competitive beings, but their true competitive nature only surfaces for the 
benefit of their offspring. Cassar et al. (2016) tested female competitiveness using an experiment 
adapted from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) which offers subjects the opportunity to compete 
for cash and another opportunity to compete for a prize, of equal cash value, that strictly benefits 
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children. The results from the cash scheme verified the established literature on female 
competitiveness, but the children’s prize scheme induced competition among women that equated 
levels of male competition. Within a polygynous context, such findings would suggest that co-
wives would engage in competitive behavior if resources are generally limited, particularly if 
there are stakes involving offspring. 
2.2 Competition in Polygynous Households 
Several models of competition have been observed in polygynous household. Bove and 
Valeggia (2009) characterize polygyny as an example of ‘‘cooperative conflict’’ among co-wives, 
where cooperation is necessary for childrearing, domestic production, or farm work. Rivalry 
emerges over splitting the time, resources, attention and affection of the shared husband. This 
dynamic gives rise to differential reproductive and resource outcomes. Rossi (2018) argues that 
fertility strategies are expressions of these competitive interactions in polygynous households. 
Rossi first identifies the impact of polygamy on fertility by measuring the birth spacing before 
and after the arrival of the second wife. A second model is used to estimate birth intervals with a 
baseline hazard specific to each woman by comparing the birth rates of the same woman in the 
monogamous stage and in the polygamous stage. Together, these models accurately predict that 
children are strategic compliments; polygynous women raise their fertility in response to an 
increase by their co-wife because children can secure access to resources controlled by the 
husband. 
It is common for a co-wife’s rank within the household to be established in part by her 
childbearing capacity. Her rank then determines her resource allocation (Desai, 1992; Bove and 
Valeggia, 2009; Madhavan, 2002; Rossi, 2018). Co-wife competition is heightened whenever 
women and their children are more dependent on their husband for resources or attention. In 
particular, competition in certain households is most intense when wives vie for a husband’s 
investment in their children’s health and education, especially for sons with special status in the 
family hierarchy (Bledsoe, 1993; Rossi, 2018). In countries that restrict spousal benefits such as 
identity documents or health benefits to only one wife, competition may also be fierce in an effort 
to secure their reproductive value and household rank (Bove and Valeggia, 2009).  
2.3 Theories of Polygyny 
The predominant theoretical model of polygyny, known as the Polygyny Threshold 
Model, connects the practice of polygyny in the animal kingdom to evolutionary processes 
(Verner & Willson, 1966). The theory posits that when female species select mates according to 
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their biological fitness, they opt to mate with males who possess superior fitness characteristics, 
such as genes, food supply, and environment, in order to ensure the survival and success of 
offspring. These characteristics are held by relatively few males within the group, not by all, who 
become the preferred mating partner for the majority of females (Orians, 1969).  
Empirical extensions of the Polygyny Threshold Model to humans link the prevalence of 
polygyny to societies in which men control resources and where there is greater wealth 
inequality, thereby influencing female reproductive choice towards more resourced male 
partners. Investigations into Kenyan polygyny, for example, demonstrate a positive correlation 
between amount of land ownership with number of wives (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987). Data from 
the Kipsigis people of Kenya, show that women first select male partners who offer the best 
reproductive opportunities in terms of material wealth. Once land ownership is controlled for, 
Kipsigis women prefer bachelors over monogamists and polygynists as a way of minimizing the 
personal costs of reproduction (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1990). 
Human applications of the Polygyny Threshold Model suggest that polygyny should 
become more prevalent as human societies shifted away from sustenance farming, a system which 
maintained a relatively flat society, to larger-scale agricultural systems, a system which 
engenders social and economic stratification. In fact, polygyny has become less practiced as 
societies have become more unequal. This is known as “Polygyny Paradox.” Later works solve 
the Polygyny Paradox by expanding the Polygyny Threshold Model to account for two-sided 
mating choices (i.e. female and male choice), where male choice is based on the number of wives 
which maximize his own fitness. They identify the conditions that produced parallel transitions 
away from polygyny and towards agriculture and thus explain the “Polygyny Paradox”: 
“(i) in these highly stratified economies, the fraction of men with sufficient wealth to make polygynous 
marriage an attractive option for them and their potential partners is low relative to other subsistence 
systems, and (ii) decreasing marginal fitness returns to increasing number of wives above and beyond the 
fitness costs of sharing a husband's wealth sharply limit the number of wives acquired by exceptionally 
wealthy individuals.” (Ross et al., 2018) 
 
2.4 Household Efficiency 
The focus of empirical work on the topic of polygyny in economics has centered around 
the concept of household efficiency in an attempt to affirm, reject or reformulate theory of the 
household. Much of this work tests the theoretical construct of the collective household model (a 
model that allows for differing preferences within a single household) and its ability to achieve 
efficiency (married partners take advantage of opportunities that make the household better off). 
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The folk theorem approach to cooperative game theory, where repeated interactions can lead to 
enforcement mechanisms that secure the cooperative outcome, predicts a Pareto superior 
outcome for spouses (Chiappori and Mazzucco, 2017). Yet it is widely documented that 
households often fail to achieve efficiency (Duflo and Udry, 2004). Some studies show that this is 
acutely true for polygynous households with regard to production, consumption, and distribution 
(Akresh, 2011; Rossi, 2018; Kazianga and Klonner, 2006). Others contend that the practice has 
been sustained precisely due to efficiency gains (Lawson et al., 2015; Munro et al., 2010; Boserup, 
1970).  
The first challenge to the household efficiency assumption came from Udry (1996) who 
used data from farm yields in Burkina Faso from plots cultivated by different members of the 
household. Yields were substantially lower on plots controlled by women, which meant that 
women received smaller plots to cultivate although, on average women achieve higher values of 
output per hectare on smaller plots than men. This study demonstrates that resource allocation 
is determined by gender and such divisions fail to maximize household efficiency (Udry, 1996). 
Kazianga and Klonner (2006) test the intrahousehold efficiency assumption in a polygynous 
context by examining the co-movement of child survival odds and child investment. Their 
estimations fail to reject the hypothesis of efficient child investment in monogamous households, 
implying that all children, regardless of birth order or sex, have equal chances of surviving. In 
contrast, the researchers reject the efficient resource allocation hypotheses for children of junior 
wives but not senior wives. These results confirm the narrative evidence of polygynous unions, 
which consistently brings to light the diminished bargaining power and disadvantaged economic 
position of junior wives.  
Another approach to examining efficiency can be taken from the perspective of 
maximizing the common pot. In this sense, distribution is a secondary concern if dynamics within 
the household are reducing total income. An examination of this perspective comes from Barr et 
al. (2018) who conducted a field experiment involving a public goods game in Nigeria with 
polygynous and monogamous spouses. The experiment is played between spouses and co-wives. 
Each individual was given a sum of money and the choice to either keep any amount for one’s self 
or contribute whatever fraction to a shared fund that would be multiplied by 1.5 and divided 
between the two players. Higher contributions indicate greater cooperation and hence, greater 
household efficiency, as each player was given the choice to maximize real earnings for the 
household or keep an undivided lesser amount for one’s self. The researchers found that, 
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controlling for baseline levels of cooperation for the individual, contributions towards the shared 
fund are significantly lower within polygynous compared to monogamous couples, both between 
co-wives and between polygynous men towards their wives.  
An earlier study, also from Nigeria, finds the opposite effect (Munro et al., 2010). This 
study also employs a public goods game to evaluate household efficiency in polygynous 
households, using monogamous households as a counterfactual. It finds that, while all subjects 
retain at least half of their game endowments for personal gain, polygynous subjects are not less 
efficient than monogamous subjects. In fact, polygynous men receive higher payoffs from their 
wives than do monogamous men. Additionally, senior wives receive more from their husbands 
than junior wives.  
2.5 Cooperation and Efficiency 
Lawson et al. (2015) argue that polygyny has been practiced in more than 80% of pre- 
industrial societies, which implies that there must be some perceived benefit to those who 
participate. The “polygyny-threshold model” tested by Lewis et al. (2015) posits that women 
chose polygyny when the associated costs are offset by greater resource access than monogamy 
marriage can offer. In particular, the costs of sharing a husband are offset by the land and 
livestock that women gain by joining polygynous union. This study found no difference between 
the monogamous and polygynous households of Tanzania on food security and child health after 
differences in environmental vulnerability and socioeconomic marginalization are accounted for. 
Households in this study are able to achieve a critical level of efficiency thereby sustaining the 
practice of polygyny in the region.  
Akresh et al. (2016) was able to demonstrate efficiency in production between co-wives 
through agricultural production in Burkina Faso. Using data on monogamous and polygynous 
agricultural households, Akresh et al. observe greater cooperation among co-wives than among 
monogamous or polygynous spouses. Co-wives share fewer resources with one another and were 
thus able to achieve higher levels of cooperation than spouses. Fewer resources in common 
creates an emotional distance that enables cooperation. The theory that emerges from these 
results is that less altruism can actually increase the incentive to cooperate by lowering the utility 
one expects to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. The reward for cooperation will be larger 
for individuals without altruistic ties who might not otherwise engage in any mutually beneficial 
behavior.  
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The most recent advancement on this topic also affirms the ability of polygynous 
households to attain economic efficiency (Hidrobo et al., 2019). Another public goods game, this 
time in Senegal among semi-nomadic pastoralist households, shows no differences in 
contribution rates or reciprocity between sexes and marriage types. For farming and pastoralist 
households, coordination in production is essential to their survival. Such a lifestyle appears to 
foster greater cooperation in polygynous households. This could even be the reason polygyny 
has persisted into the present.  
The existing body of economics literature offers contradictory evidence of the conditions 
related to polygyny. On the one hand, the marriage structure proves as efficient as the alternative. 
On the other hand, it is crippled by conflict between co-wives. In light of this mixed evidence, 
more research is needed to enhance our understanding of the costs and benefits of the marriage 
structure. Cooperation and competition are the root behaviors that affect vital life outcomes for 
household members. This research attempts to quantify these interpersonal dynamics and 
provide an empirical measure that can provide the link between marriage type and various life 
outcomes. In doing so, we can further our knowledge of this long-standing practice and provide 
solutions to development challenges that are unique to the practice of polygyny. 
  
3. Experimental Design  
This study includes two experiments we will refer to as “Competition” and “Cooperation”. 
To capture variation across monogamous and polygynous households, as well as within 
polygynous households (between co-wives and their husbands), we use within-subject design 
experiments as the empirical method of this study. In doing so, we create realistic scenarios 
through the use of salient payoffs that will induce the behaviors of interest. This method observes 
the subjects’ behavior directly through their choices in games that mimic real-life events such as 
situations involving resource acquisition and allocation. As such, the identification strategy for 
this study is based on variation across subjects within the two experiments.  
3.1 Experimental Data  
The sample consists of 593 individuals from the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sierra 
Leone (Appendix A). 254 are monogamous men and women, 338 are polygynous. Of the 
polygynous, 110 are men and 228 are women. The married sample includes both husband and 
wife from the same household and the entire polygynous node. Households with three wives are 
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dropped in some estimations to maintain consistency in our sample. This brings the poly sample 
size to 314 for estimations involving spouse opponents or co-wife opponents. 
Two of the four provinces in Sierra Leone were randomly selected for sampling. Fourteen 
villages were randomly selected within the eastern and north-western provinces. Within each 
village, every third house in randomly selected neighborhoods were invited to participate. Only 
households for which all adult members were able and willing to participate were included.  
All subjects participated in two experiments and completed a survey. Each subject was 
paid for participating in the survey and for one of the experiments randomly chosen by a die toss. 
The subjects understood that their total payment would be conditional on their performance and 
choices in the experiments.  
Each session was conducted in private and are confidential so as to elicit authentic 
responses and eliminate the potential for retaliatory or reciprocal behavior. Activities were 
conducted in random order and included the competition game, the cooperation game, two short 
games that serve as controls for the competition game, and a survey. The games consisted of 
multiple rounds which were also randomized using a die.  
3.2 The Competition Experiment  
The competition experiment utilizes standard experimental protocol of eliciting 
competitive preferences first developed by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Our study builds on 
the experiment to measure individuals’ baseline desire to compete against their desire to compete 
against specific opponents. Subjects perform multiple one-minute rounds of mental summation: 
1+8=9, 9+3=12, 12+2=14, etc. Mental summation is a quotidian function in Sierra Leone. Even 
those with little education and low literacy perform it for most transactions. The summation 
always begins with the correct answer to the previous problem, as demonstrated above, so that 
those who are mathematically challenged can easily count up to the correct answer. Only 
numbers 1 through 10 are added to the summation so to maintain simplicity.  
In the beginning of each round, each subject is told who their opponent is and then asked 
whether they would like to compete with the opponent in a “tournament” or simply play by 
themselves for “piece rate”. In the piece-rate scheme, they are paid 1000 leones1 (le) for each 
correct answer. In a tournament, they are paid le 2000 for each correct answer if their score is 
higher than their opponent’s. Otherwise, they receive nothing.  
                                               
1 About $0.12 at the time of the study. 
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Unlike previous versions of this experiment, the opponent changes in each round. In first 
round, subjects play against only themselves for piece-rate so that we can measure their baseline 
performance. The second round is a compulsory tournament against an anonymous person from 
the same village whose score has been obtained in advance. This measures baseline competitive 
behavior. The third round gives the subject the choice between piece-rate or tournament against 
an anonymous person in the same village. This round indicates the subject’s preference for 
competition. All subjects play the first three rounds. In the fourth round, the opponent is the 
subject’s spouse. Poly men have separate rounds with respect to each of his wives. Poly women 
have an additional round with the option to play against their co-wife. 
In light of the literature that suggests that women are not as competitive as men, even 
with cash incentives, we can interpret the desire to compete as being driven by the particular 
opponent. We rely on the third round to establish the subject’s baseline competitiveness, coupled 
with controls for risk tolerance and confidence, to isolate behavior in relation to the variation in 
opponents. The results for the monogamous subjects serve as counterfactual for choices of 
polygynous subjects. 
 
Table 1     
Round Opponent Who plays 
1 Self Everyone 
 Piece-Rate  
2 Anonymous person in the same village Everyone 
 Mandatory Tournament  
3 Anonymous person in the same village Everyone 
 Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament  
4 Spouse Mono men & women, poly women 
 Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament  
5 First wife/senior co-wife Poly men, 2nd wives 
 Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament  
6 Second wife/junior co-wife Poly men, 1st wives 
 Choice Piece-Rate or Tournament  
 
3.3 The Cooperation Experiment  
This experiment was developed by Fehr, Bernhard and Rockenbach (2008) to understand 
other- regarding social preferences of children using a series of abridged dictator games. Bauer, 
Cassar, Chytilová, and Henrich (2014) use an expanded version of the Fehr et al. protocol to elicit 
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social preferences for children and adults who have experienced inter-group conflict. The Ferh 
et al. experiment entails three treatments, the prosocial, sharing, and envy games, while the 
Bauer et al. experiment adds a fourth treatment called the costless envy game. Our experiment 
consists of the four treatments from Bauer et al. and adapts the experiment for adults in order to 
reveal social preferences for strangers, spouses and co-wives.  
The Sharing game presents the subject with the choice between an allocation of 1,1 (1 
unit for self, the “sender”, and 1 unit for the “receiver”), and allocation of 2,0 (2 units for self and 
0 for the receiver). Our experiment departs from the previous experiments in that the payoffs are 
in cash, so that 1 unit is equivalent to le 5000 (about USD$0.60) and 2 units represent le 10,000. 
The sender decides between le 5000 for one’s self and le 5000 for the receiver, or le 10,000 for 
one’s self and nothing for the receiver. This treatment distinguishes between preference for equal 
allocation versus self-maximizing allocation. Implicit in the 1,1 option is a strong expression of 
the subject’s aversion to inequality because it is ultimately costly. The 2,0 option could be an 
expression of ill will or simply the desire to maximize personal gains. Whatever the motivating 
behavior may be (combining games and our survey data shed light on those questions), we can 
conclude that the behavior has an unambiguous economic impact on the receiver.  
Fehr et al.’s “prosocial” treatment is known as the Costless Sharing game in this 
experiment and is a choice between the same 1,1 allocation described above and a 1,0 allocation 
(le 5000 for self, nothing for the receiver). This game reveals preferences for either equality if 1,1 
is selected or advantageous inequality towards the receiver if 1,0 is selected. By equating the 
payoff for the sender in both choices, we can eliminate economic self-interest as a motive. Thus, 
a 1,1 choice will indicate a preference for equality while a 1,0 choice will indicate a preference for 
advantageous inequality with respect to the receiver.  
The next treatment, the Costless Envy game, offers a choice of 1,1 and 1,2, (le 5000, le 
5000 or le 5000 for self, le 10,000 for the receiver). Consistent with the previous game, the sender 
can award the receiver without detracting from his own gains, but choosing the unequal 
allocation subjects the sender to disadvantageous inequality. How the sender feels about 
disadvantageous inequality versus equality is conveyed in the outcome of this game.  
The Envy game comes from Bauer et al. (2014) and poses the question 1,1 versus 2,3. In 
this experiment, the unequal allocation is exaggerated:  2,6 (le 5000, le 5000 or le 10,000 for self, 
le 30,000 for the receiver). The 2,6 choice subjects the sender, once again, to disadvantageous 
inequality but at a higher price than in the costless envy game. This game is used to illuminate 
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other-regarding preferences that actually reduce individual gains. How strongly a subject feels 
about equality and/or disadvantageous inequality is brought to light by this game. However, the 
egalitarian option could be revealing a preference for equality rather than an aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality. We will discuss in another section how we can use the outcomes of 
these games to explicate the drivers of behavior.  
This study is interested in individual behavior towards people with specific relationships 
to the sender; the monogamous spouse, the polygynous wives, and co-wives in particular. To 
understand how the behavior in these games may differ depending on the relationship of the 
receiver to the sender, we change the receiver in each round. The subject, known in this 
experiment as the sender, is asked a series of binary choice questions in the form of dictator 
games. There are six rounds, each consisting of the aforementioned four games, but not all 
subjects complete all six rounds. In the first round, the receiver is an anonymous person in the 
same village. In the second round, the receiver is an anonymous person in a distant village. The 
results of the first two rounds indicate baseline pro-sociality of the subject. In the third round, 
the receiver is the subject’s spouse. Polygynous men do not participate in this round. The fourth 
round involves the first wife as the receiver. If the subject herself is the first wife, she will not 
complete this round, as in the Competition game. Second wives are the receivers in the fifth 
round. Monogamous subjects do not participate in rounds 4 & 5. Poly men “send” to their first 
and second wives in these rounds. Poly women send to their co-wives.  
Cash payoffs are used with the understanding that the subject will get paid for the 
experiment according to their choices in the games so that we can ascertain the potential 
economic impact of their social preferences. Thus, a choice allocation of 1,1 with respect to a 
spouse as opposed to a cash-maximizing allocation of 2,6 or 1,2 would suggest that social 
preferences impact household finances and the ability for households to achieve maximum 
financial gain. The anonymous receivers serve as a counterfactual, so that we can differentiate 
between a subject’s minimum level of pro-sociality with their social preferences towards receiver 
known to them. 
Table 2     
Games Receiver Who plays (Senders) 
1 Anonymous person in the same village Everyone 
2 Anonymous person in a distant village Everyone 
3 Spouse Mono men & women, poly women 
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4 First wife Poly men, 2nd wives 
5 Second wife Poly men, 1st wives 
 
Table 3   
Games Senders are asked: 
Sharing le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 10,000 self and le 0 for receiver. 
Costless Sharing le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 5000 self and le 0 for receiver. 
Costless Envy le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 5000 self and le 10,000 for receiver. 
Envy le 5000 for self and le 5000 for receiver or le 10,000 self and le 30,000 for receiver. 
 
3.4 Behavior Types 
Combining the cooperation game choices, subject behavior can be grouped into five types: 
Selfish, Generous, Spiteful, Egalitarian and Resource Maximizer. The selfish type maximizes 
his/her payoffs in the sharing game (choosing 2,0) and envy game (choosing 2,6), resulting in 
maximum payoff for one’s self. Generous types maximize payoffs for the receiver in all four games 
by choosing 1,1 for sharing; 1,1 for costless sharing; 1,2 for costless envy; and 2,6 for envy. 
Spiteful types minimize the total payoffs for the other person and deny themselves resources in 
the process. They forgo the higher allocations for themselves in order to disadvantage the other 
person. They choose 2,0 in sharing, 1,0 in costless sharing, and 1,1 in costless envy and 1,1 in 
envy. The egalitarian type will select 1,1 for all four games. Our analysis adds a 5th type, the 
Resource Maximizer, who selects the allocation that maximizes resources for first themselves 
and then the receiver. When the subject is resource maximizing with their spouse, for example, 
they select either allocation in sharing; 1,1 in costless sharing; 1,2 in costless envy; and 2,6 in 
envy. These choices differ slightly for a stranger. When resource maximizing with a stranger, 
the subject would select 2,0 in sharing; 1,1 in costless sharing; 1,2 in costless envy; and 2,6 in 
envy. Subjects who do not conform to these four categories will have a 0 value for these variables.  
 
Table 4 
 
Sharing 5000/5000 10000/0 5000/5000 10000/0 5000/5000 10000/0 5000/5000 10000/0 5000/5000 10000/0
Costless Sharing 5000/5000 5000/0 5000/5000 5000/0 5000/5000 5000/0 5000/5000 5000/0 5000/5000 5000/0
Costless Envy 5000/5000 5000/10000 5000/5000 5000/10000 5000/5000 5000/10000 5000/5000 5000/10000 5000/5000 5000/10000
Envy 5000/5000 10000/30000 5000/5000 10000/30000 5000/5000 10000/30000 5000/5000 10000/30000 5000/5000 10000/30000
Spiteful Generous Egalitarian Resource MaximizerSelfish
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4. Estimation 
4.1  Hypotheses 
This study is interested in cooperation and competition across monogamous and 
polygynous households. The two experiments described above tests the following hypotheses 
between monogamous and polygynous households:  
(1) Competition Experiment: There is a difference greater than zero between monogamous 
and polygynous subjects when competing against their spouse. 
(2) Cooperation Experiment: There is a difference greater than zero between monogamous 
and polygynous subjects when allocation resources to their spouse. 
4.2  Competition Specification 
A logit model and a random effects model are used to estimate competition in the 
household for monogamous couples and polygynous nodes. The dependent variable is a dummy 
denoting the subject’s choice to compete against spouse (Competition_Spouse). A 1 value represents 
the choice tournament and 0 represents the choice piece-rate. A logit model estimates 
competition as a function of marital structure and personal characteristics, all conditional on 
various controls, and then interpreted using coefficients from a linear probability model. In this 
regression series, we obtain the discrete effects of sex (male/female) and marriage structure 
(mono/poly). The same estimation is repeated with choice to compete against stranger as the 
dependent variable (Competition_Spouse).  
 
(1) Competition_Spousei = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + 𝜷4ProbWini + 𝜷5RiskTolerancei + 𝜷6Confidencei + θi + εi 
(2) Competition_Strangeri = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + 𝜷4ProbWini + 𝜷5RiskTolerancei + 𝜷6Confidencei + θi + εi 
 
Female and Poly are dummy variables, FemalePoly is an interaction to ascertain the effect 
of being a polygynous woman, θ is a vector of personal characteristic controls (a wealth index 
variable, region, education, children, tribe, age) and ε is an error-term. ProbWin is determined 
by the number of correct answers in round 2, thereby controlling for the subject’s baseline 
competitive performance. The RiskTolerance control comes from the risk experiment 
(Appendix B), wherein subjects choose one of six lotteries to bet on, each with a different 
allocation of money. The less risky lottery is worth le 12,000 if successful and le 12,000 on 
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failure. The riskiest lottery is worth le 40,000 if successful and le 0 on failure. After the subject 
chooses their lottery a coin toss determines the success. This control establishes the baseline 
risk tolerance of the subject. Confidence is the different between the subject’s score for the round 
and what the subject believes is their opponent’s scores. Lower values for the confidence variable 
represent less confidence. Competition equals 1 if the tournament payment scheme was chosen 
in round 3, when spouse is the opponent. For poly men, this value is the mean of game choices 
for first and second wives. The variable can take the value of .5 if he selected to compete with 
one wife and not the other.   
The second model for estimating competition uses random effects regression. This 
model allows us to compare behavior towards a spouse to that of a stranger in order to account 
for the subject’s baseline competitiveness. We transform our dataset into a panel with multiple 
observations per subject: choice to compete against the score of an anonymous person in the 
same village (stranger) and choice to compete against spouse (averaged choice for poly men). 
The dependent variable is equal to 0 if piece-rate is chosen or 1 if tournament is chosen. The 
treatment dummy is equal to 0 for choice against stranger and 1 for choice against spouse. The 
result is interpreted as the difference between the aggregate effect of the spouse treatment and 
the aggregate effect of the stranger treatment. Statistically insignificant values and values near 
0 represent no difference in behavior toward stranger and spouse. Statistically significant 
positive or negative values represent departures from behavior towards stranger. 
(3) Competitionij = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Treatmentj + 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + 𝜷4ProbWini  + 𝜷5RiskTolerancei + 𝜷6Confidencei + θi + εi 
 
The next set of regressions take the form of model (2) but are separately restricted by 
subpopulation (poly women, mono women, poly men, mono men). The panel now has two or 
three observations per subject, dependent on subject type.  For mono subjects, competition 
includes stranger and spouse as in model (2). For poly women, the panel contains includes for 
stranger (omitted), co-wife and husband. Likewise, for poly men the panel includes choice for 
stranger, first wife, and second wife.  
(4) Competitionij = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Treatmentj + 𝜷2ProbWini  + 𝜷3RiskTolerancei + 𝜷4Confidencei + θi + εi 
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4.3  Cooperation Specification 
The framework for analyzing the cooperation game and the behavior types comes from 
Bauer et al. (2014) and is adapted to capture variation between subjects and their spouses. 
Consistent with the competition methodology, we estimate the following models separately 
with regard to spouse and stranger. 
(5) Sharingi = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(6) Costless Sharingi = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(7) Envyi = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(8) Costless Envyi = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
 
 
Where the dependent variable is 1 or 0, indicating allocation choice when the receiver 
is the spouse (round 3), except in the case of poly men whose choices have been averaged across 
wives (rounds 4 and 5). The 1 value always represents the equal allocation (le 5000 for self, le 
5000 for the other person), and the 0 value represents the unequal allocation (refer to Table 3). 
First, as per the competition specifications, a logit model is used to compare the cooperation 
choices across gender and marriage type (5-8). A linear probability estimation is used to 
interpret results. Second, we use a panel in conjunction with random effects regression to 
distinguish between behavior towards a stranger and the spouse (9). The second process is 
repeated separately for the four subject categories2 to isolate the effect for each subpopulation 
(10). All four games (sharing, costless sharing, envy, costless envy) take the same form:  
(9) Gameij = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Treatmentj + 𝜷2Femalei + 𝜷3Polyi + 𝜷4FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(10) Gameij = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Treatmentj + θi + εi 
 
4.4  Behavior Type Specification 
The behavior type analysis is adopted from Fehr et al. (2008) and adapted to 
characterize subject behavior towards a stranger, spouse or co-wife. We do not estimate 
spiteful behavior because so few subjects qualify. The spiteful category is added back during 
the co-wife analysis. 
(11) Selfishi = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(12) Generousi = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
                                               
2 The four subject types are poly women, mono women, poly men, and mono men. The poly men model includes 
variables for choice stranger, first wife, and second wife. Poly women model includes variables for choice stranger, 
co-wife, and husband. 
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(13) Egalitariani = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(14) Resource Maximizeri = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Femalei+ 𝜷2Polyi + 𝜷3FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
 
Co-wife Analysis only: 
 
(15) Spitefuli = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1FirstWifei + θi + εi 
 
The dependent variables are dummies, with 1 denoting that the subject carries that label 
according to the description in section 3.4. The firstwife variable used in the co-wife analysis is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the subject is first wife. As with competition and cooperation estimations, 
we estimate behavior types using a panel with random effects on the full sample (16) followed by 
the same estimations restricted to the subpopulations (17). 
(16) BehaviorTypeij = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Treatmentj + 𝜷2Femalei + 𝜷3Polyi + 𝜷4FemalePolyi + θi + εi 
(17) BehaviorTypeij = 𝜷0 + 𝜷1Treatmentj + θi + εi 
 
4.5  Control Variables 
Wealth is constructed as an average of an index of six components (home ownership, 
electricity in the home, land ownership, television ownership, hunger frequency, income). Makeni 
is a regional dummy that assigns 1 to subjects from the Makeni region and 0 to subjects from the 
Kenema region. Education is an ordinal variable with 5 bins that represent different levels of 
education. 0 equals less than primary school education, 1 equals primary school completion, 2 
equals secondary school education, 3 equals college or post-secondary education, and 4 equals 
graduate education. Children is a continuous variable corresponding to the subject’s number of 
biological children. There are two dummy variables representing the largest tribes in the sample, 
Mende and Temne. Each tribe separately constitutes over 40% of the subject pool. The age variable 
is a continuous variable and missing for subjects who do not know their age or birth year. 
 
5. Results 
The results are presented in a series of regressions starting with the most naïve form and 
progressively adding more independent variables of interest, followed by covariates specific to 
the experiment, and then demographic controls. The age variable is added separately, as it 
substantially decreases the observations3.  
                                               
3 Many subjects in our sample do not know their own age or birth year. 
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5.1  Competition Logit & Linear Probability Estimations 
 In Table 5, the predicted disparity in female competition is easily observed; women are 
15% less likely to compete against their spouse than men, significant at the 1% level4. This effect 
drops to 12% once the demographic controls are added, significant at only the 10% level. The 
education variable absorbs almost all variation in a predictable way. Increased education leads to 
0.7 percentage point (pp) change choosing tournament against spouse, significant at the 1% level.  
Once the game specific controls are added (risk tolerance, likelihood of winning, and confidence), 
those correlated with education absorb all of the subject variation in game choice against spouse, 
leaving no difference in choice between male and female subjects. This pattern of results is 
common for many of the subsequent estimations.  
 The logit and linear probability models detect no statistically significant effect of being 
polygynous. In the naïve estimation restricted to mono subjects only, mono women are 0.17 pp 
less likely to choose tournament against their spouse than mono men, significant at the 1% level. 
The effect drops off after controls are progressively added. Restricting the estimation to poly 
subjects only unveils a similar pattern of results between the sexes; there is an initial effect of 
poly women choosing to compete with -0.15 likelihood as compared to poly men, but only in the 
naïve regression. These results suggest that female choice to compete against spouse in mono 
and poly households is highly correlated with education, risk tolerance, and confidence.  
 Restricting the estimation to male subjects only, we see no difference between poly and 
mono. Female subject estimations reveal the opposite result: poly women show a slight uptick in 
choice to compete against spouse compared to mono women, a 0.09 greater likelihood, significant 
with 90% confidence. In this regression, the children variable is statistically significant at the 5% 
and 10% levels, with a 0.3 pp higher propensity to compete with spouse associated with an extra 
child. Though this result is not wholly conclusive, poly women appear more competitive with 
their spouses than mono women, both according to the model and mean choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 All statistically significant results reported in this paper reflect a 95% or 99% confidence level unless otherwise 
stated.  
 20 
Figure 1 
 
 
 We estimate the outcome variable, choice to compete against stranger, in the same way 
(Table 7). Mean choice to compete for poly and mono men is 0.63 and 0.67 respectively, while 
women compete about 10% less. Men compete with a stranger at approximately the same rate as 
they compete with their spouse. Women compete about 10% less with their spouse than a 
stranger. This effect is confirmed in the naïve regressions of female on choice to compete against 
stranger but disappears once the demographic controls are introduced to the estimation. The 
effect of being female electing to compete against a stranger is associated with almost 20% less 
wealth and 10% more education. The magnitude of these effects diminishes once we introduce 
the game controls. Competing against a stranger is associated with about higher confidence and 
likelihood of winning. 
 The polygyny and female x polygyny coefficients are not statistically significant. Restricting 
by subpopulation shows no differences in choice to compete against a stranger. All of the 
differences in subject type emerge when competing against a spouse. While men compete at 
roughly the same rate with spouse and stranger, women compete less in general, and even less 
with spouse than with stranger. This is particularly true for mono women. A simple mean 
comparison displayed by Figure 1 illustrates these results.  
Wealth is a highly significant control variable the competition estimations. Less wealth 
predicts more competition against spouse, especially for women. A one-unit decline in a woman’s 
wealth produces a 25% increase in probability that she competes against her spouse. When this 
relationship is explored further in the random effects estimations restricted to poly women, the 
wealth effect disappears and is absorbed by children and education related variables. Choice to 
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compete against a stranger also sees a strong wealth effect. This suggests that subjects may be 
choosing to compete for the possibility of doubling their prize money. 
5.2  Competition Random Effects Estimations 
To further compare these differences in subpopulations, we turn the panel estimations. 
For the full sample panel estimations, model (3), see Table 9. This analysis will focus on model 
(4) for the sake of simplicity since earlier results reveal key differences between the 
subpopulations. In the panel estimation results, reported in Table 10, mono women emerge as 
the anomaly. Mono women compete with their spouses 0.12 pp less than a stranger at a 99% 
confidence level. Only age and likelihood of winning are significant controls. Mono women 
compete with a stranger at a rate of 58% and a husband at a rate of 46%. By contrast, poly women 
show no statistically significant difference in behavior stranger, spouse or co-wife. Education, 
children, likelihood of winning, and confidence are all significant at the 1% level with a positive 
relationship with choice competition. On average, poly women compete with husband at 53%, co-
wife at 55% and stranger at 55% (Figure 2). Likewise, for men, random effects estimates show no 
difference between behavior towards stranger and behavior towards wife/wives. For poly men, 
mean choice to compete is 0.64 against a stranger, 0.68 against first wife, and 0.67 against second 
wife (Figure 3). Likelihood of winning and confidence are significant and positive controls. For 
mono men, mean choice to compete against wife is 0.63 and 0.67 against stranger.    
 
Figure 2
 
Figure 3
 
 
5.3 Cooperation Logit & Linear Probability Estimations 
 65% of all subjects share with their spouse on average (selecting the equal allocation). 
Tables 11 & 12 shows no significant difference in sharing between mono and poly subjects, nor 
between male and female subjects. Wealth is a highly significant control across all subject groups. 
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In the costless sharing game (Tables 13 & 14) all subject groups increase their sharing to an 
average rate of 0.82. Again, there is no significant difference between mono, poly, male, or female. 
In this game, one unit less wealth is associated with a 0.22 pp increase in choosing to share for 
mono subjects and 0.18 pp for poly subjects. These games highlight the importance of material 
wealth in subject’s allocation decisions. While less wealth tends to predict more sharing in both 
games, this relationship is amplified for poly subjects. 
 The Costless Envy game (Table 15) produces a broad shift in preference away from the 
equal allocation across all subjects. 34% of poly men and 36% of poly women select the equal 
allocation, while 43% of poly men and 48% of mono women select the equal allocation. In the 
simple regression, poly subjects are 0.11 pp more likely to prefer the unequal allocation 
(5000/10,000), but this difference is absorbed by the wealth and children variables once controls 
are added. However in the restricted models, poly women are 0.14 pp less likely to act with 
costless envy towards spouse than mono women. An increase in wealth of 1 unit generates 0.31 
pp greater likelihood of selecting the equal allocation. In the restricted regressions, this effect is 
even greater and statistically significant for mono subjects but insignificant for poly subjects. 
Having fewer children is also linked to selecting the 5000/5000 split. 
The same pattern is repeated in the Envy game (Tables 17 & 18), with all groups selecting 
away from the equal allocation. Poly subjects select the equal option less often then mono (0.26 
on average for poly subjects and 0.33 for mono subjects). However, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the groups after the naïve model and all controls are added. The 
controls associated with more envy (selecting the equal amount) are having fewer children for 
all subjects, more wealth for mono subjects, and being from the Kenema region for men.  
 Tables 27-30 display results for the cooperative games when the stranger is the receiver. 
There is no significant difference between the marriage types or sexes for all four games. 
Therefore, all differences in allocation preferences between the subject groups happen when the 
spouse is the receiver. Wealth continuous to be an important control in the stranger estimations, 
with less wealth associated with more sharing and costless sharing with stranger. Being from 
the Kenema region, and more years of education, are associated with envy and costless envy with 
respect to a stranger.  
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Figures 4-7 
  
  
 
5.4 Cooperation Random Effects Estimations 
All results are interpreted with respect to a stranger, which serves as a baseline for 
measuring the difference in behaviors between the subject groups and within the household. 
Tables 19-22 show that all of the following results are statistically significant at either the 5% or 
1% level, with the exception of mono men.  
Mono women distinguish themselves from the other groups again in this game. They are 
nearly twice as likely compared to the other groups to share with spouse versus stranger.  
Random effects estimates show that the probability of poly women share is greater 0.09 more 
with spouse than stranger, whereas mono women are more likely to share at 0.18 more with 
spouse than stranger. The probability that poly men share with their wives is 0.1 more than 
stranger. Mono male probability to share with wife is 0.09 more than with stranger, but this is 
only significant at the 10% level. For all subjects except mono women, less wealth is linked to 
more sharing. 
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Figure 8     Figure 9 
  
In the costless sharing game, all subjects increase the probability of sharing with spouse 
at nearly equal rates as compared to a stranger. Poly women probability to costless share is 0.09 
more with husband than with stranger, and mono women’s probability is 0.1 more. Poly male 
probability to costless share with both wives is 0.1 greater than with stranger and mono male 
probability is 0.09 more with spouse. 
Figure 10     Figure 11 
  
All subject types make statistically different choices between stranger and spouse in the 
costless envy game. The probability that poly women exhibit costless envy towards spouse is 
0.36 less than stranger. For mono women, it is 0.18 less. Poly men are 0.32 less likely to exhibit 
costless envy with both wives than strangers and mono men are 0.29 less likely. Higher wealth 
is correlated with more costless envy for mono men only. 
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Figure 12     Figure 13 
  
In the Envy game, all women are 0.24 less likely to exhibit envy with husband than 
stranger. Tribe and region are correlated with the outcome.  Poly men are 0.28 less likely to act 
with envy towards either wife as compared to stranger, and mono men are 0.26 less 
 
Figure 14     Figure 15 
  
 Poly female behavior towards co-wife is markedly different than that of behavior 
towards husband in some of the cooperation games. In the sharing game, poly women share at 
similar rates with co-wife and husband: they are 0.08 more likely to share with co-wife than 
stranger and 0.09 more likely to share with husband than stranger. There is no statistical 
difference between Costless Sharing with co-wife and stranger, whereas poly women are 0.09 
more likely to costless share with husbands than either co-wife or stranger. Poly women are 
0.14 less likely to show costless envy towards co-wife than stranger, but 0.36 less with 
husbands. The envy game shows no statistical difference between stranger and co-wife, but 
husbands are 0.24 less likely to receive envy. 
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The patterns that emerge in these games show a strong preference for husband over co-
wife when selecting allocations. Co-wives are consistently shown the same or similar treatment 
as a stranger. Poly men treat both wives approximately equally in all cooperative games. Poly 
subjects overwhelmingly select the resource maximizing option for the household, maximizing 
both for themselves and the other, but less so for co-wife than husband. Mono subjects also prefer 
the larger allocations on average, but tend towards the egalitarian option more often than poly 
subjects. Wealth is a significant factor in selecting the equal option in sharing for poly subjects, 
but not in the other games. For mono women, wealth is not significant in any of the games while 
it is significant for mono men in all games but envy.  
5.5 Behavior Types Logit & Linear Probability Estimations 
The next series of estimates describe the relationship between marriage type and behavior 
type (Tables 31-34). The behavior types are all in relation to the spouse as described in section 
3.4. There is no singular poly effect in the Selfish category. Male poly subjects are 0.14 pp less 
likely to be selfish while the poly x female interaction shows that poly women are 0.16 more likely. 
More wealth is highly correlated with being selfish. In the generous category, there is no 
statistically significant result on our variables of interest, although the initial regression shows 
a strong positive effect before controls are added. Restricted to the female subjects, poly women 
appear weakly more generous than mono women, at a 0.09 increase in probability significant at 
the 10% level. The generous type is related to possessing less wealth. The egalitarian type is 
equal across all subgroups in the full regressions, but the polygyny coefficient starts significant 
and negative initially. Poly women, and poly men to a lesser extent, stand out as resource 
maximizers. Poly women are 0.14 pp more likely than mono women to be maximizers with 
spouse in the restricted regression. The polygyny coefficient in the pooled regression begins 
positive and significant, but the effect evaporates once the demographic controls are added. Less 
wealth in particular is highly correlated with resource maximizing for poly subjects.  
5.5 Behavior Types Random Effects Estimations 
Tables 35-38 display the panel estimations for all subject types. Poly women are 0.13 less 
likely to be selfish with co-wife than stranger and equally likely to be selfish with husband and 
stranger. Mono women are also equally likely to be selfish with stranger and husband. Poly men 
are 0.19 less likely to be selfish with both wives. Mono men are as selfish with spouse as with 
stranger. The proportion of selfish types with respect to spouse are higher for poly subjects but 
note that the selfish type overlaps substantially with the resource maximizer type. 
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In the generous category, less wealth is correlated with more generosity towards spouse 
for all subjects. Poly women are 0.1 more likely to be generous with co-wife than stranger and 
0.26 more with husband than stranger. Mono women are 0.2 more likely to be generous with 
husband than stranger. Poly men are 0.25 more likely to be generous with both wives than 
stranger and mono men are 0.22 more likely.  
 The egalitarian type is correlated with more wealth in general, with mono women as the 
exception. Poly women are equally egalitarian with husband and stranger, but 0.13 less likely to 
be egalitarian with co-wife. Mono women and men are as egalitarian with stranger as with 
spouse. Poly men are 0.18 less likely to be egalitarian with wives than with stranger. Note that 
egalitarianism is in opposition with the generous and resource maximizing types. The proportion 
of poly who are egalitarian with spouse is 0.15 and 0.24 for stranger. Mono have a higher 
proportion of egalitarians towards both: 0.30 for stranger and 0.36 for spouse. 
The resource maximizer type with respect to spouse is dominated by poly subjects. 
Interestingly, the means are identical for men and women. 53% of poly subjects maximize with 
spouse as compared to 39% of mono subjects (Figure 16). 64.26% of spouse maximizers are poly: 
45% of which are poly women and 19% are poly men. When it comes to maximizing with a 
stranger, only about 16% of subjects do so on average. Compared to a stranger, poly women are 
more likely to maximize with co-wife by 0.09 and 0.35 with husband.  The likelihood of mono 
women maximizing with spouse is 0.23 more than with a stranger. Poly men are likely to 
maximize with both wives on average by 0.36 more than with a stranger. Mono men are more 
likely to maximize by 0.26 more with wife. Less wealth in these estimations leads to more 
resource maximizing. 
         Figures 16-19  
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5.6 Co-Wife Analysis 
Competition 
Just over half of all poly women choose to compete with stranger, husband, and co-wife 
(Figure 20). They compete with each opponent at approximately the same rate. The only 
exception is choice to compete against co-wife for junior wives. Nearly 60% of second wives opt 
to compete with first wives. 
In the logit and linear probability regressions, the subjects are limited to poly women 
only. We regress a dummy variable for first wife onto a dummy for choice to compete against co-
wife. The results in Tables 39 & 40 show that effect of being the first wife on choice to compete 
with co-wife is -0.13, significant with 95% confidence. Wealth is not a significant control variable 
but children are: adding another child produces 8% greater likelihood of competing with co-wife. 
Confidence, education, and likelihood of winning are all positive and significant.  
Next we run two random effects regressions. In the first, husband is the omitted category 
with the regressions run for first wives and second wives separately. Table 41 shows that first 
wives compete with co-wife at an equal rate as husband. Second wives compete with co-wives 8% 
more than husbands, significant at the 5% level. The same process is repeated with stranger as 
the omitted category (Table 42). Both first wives and second wives compete with co-wife at an 
equal rate as stranger. Children and the education related controls are significant and positive.  
Behavior Types 
Figures 21-25 show the percentage of poly women in each behavior type, displayed by 
wife rank. Approximately 20% of poly women exhibit spiteful behavior towards co-wife in the 
cooperation games. That is nearly a 100% increase from spitefulness towards husband. 26.5% 
exhibit selfish behavior towards co-wife, similar to selfishness towards husband. Maximizing 
behavior dramatically retreats to just around 10% from over 50% when maximizing with 
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husband. Similarly, generous behavior drops from 36% with husband to about 10% with co-wife. 
Interestingly, junior and senior wives match in each other in representation of the different 
behavior types.   
Tables 43 & 44 reports results for the logit and linear probability estimations for behavior 
types. In these estimations, the behavior is always with respect to the co-wife. We see no 
difference between first and second wives for all behavior types.  
The panel estimations, which compare co-wife and husband to stranger, are displayed in 
Table 45. These estimations were also executed separately for first and second wives. In the 
selfish category, there is no difference in results for first wives or second wives. They are equally 
selfish towards stranger, co-wife and husband. 
 First wives and second wives are equally generous with stranger as with co-wife. They 
are about 27% more generous with husband. Less wealth is correlated with being generous. They 
are both 23% less egalitarian with co-wife than stranger, but only about 14% less with husband 
than stranger. This means they are disadvantaging co-wife, and themselves in the process, more 
often than with husband. First wives and second wives are equal maximizers with cowife and 
stranger, but they are maximizing much more with husband. About 39% more, regardless of 
wealth. They are also 16% more spiteful with co-wife than stranger or husband. For junior wives, 
less wealth means more spite towards co-wife.  
         Figures 20-25  
  
 30 
  
  
  
6. Discussion 
In this section we explore the connections between gender, marriage structure, control 
variables, and game outcomes. There are patterns in female behavior that differ from male 
behavior, as well as poly behavior that differs from mono behavior. Recognizing the inherent 
differences in the subpopulations (mono men, mono women, poly men, poly women) related to 
gender, marriage structure, level of personal agency, belief system, place in society, and every 
combination therein; this analysis examines each group separately as they each possess a different 
set of constraints and motivations. 
This analysis focuses on the ways in which choice and behavior of the subpopulations are 
the same and different. This analysis data cannot disentangle completely the motivations of each 
subject group, but by combining the dependent variable results with patterns in control variables 
and survey data, we gain insights into the motivations behind the game outcomes.  
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6.1 Competition 
 Female competitiveness in the competition game cannot be explained by biological factors 
because the disparity between male and female choice to compete is eliminated after controlling 
for education-related variables. This result suggests that desire to compete in this game is 
dependent on educational opportunities afforded to women and the confidence they feel as a 
consequence of those opportunities, rather than a biological disinclination. Mean education for 
men is 1.187 (bins ranging from 0-4) and 0.586 for women5. The results show that this disparity 
in education manifests as lower competitiveness in female subjects.  
Poly men compete more on average than mono men (67% versus 63%). Although the 
average education for mono men is 1.41 and only 0.935 for poly men6 this difference does not 
affect their desire to compete with spouse or stranger. The mental summation task was designed 
to be simple enough for any subject regardless of formal education, as mental summation is a 
function in everyday life in Sierra Leone. The average score is consistently lower for poly men 
but there is no statistically significant difference in scores between poly and mono men for any 
of the competition game rounds. This allows us to conclude that the education differential does 
not meaningfully affect scores nor does it deter poly men from competing at a higher rate than 
mono men. 
Mono and poly women exhibit stark differences in this game: while poly women compete 
more in general and at the same rate against all opponents, mono women compete 0.12 
percentage points less with spouse than a stranger. There are no statistically significant 
differences between mono and poly women in terms of wealth or education, although mean 
education for poly women is 0.53 compared to 0.69 for mono women. What motivates this 
difference in behavior? The preference for piece-rate when competing against spouse could be 
due to the larger education differential between mono husbands and wives compared to poly. 
Mono women perform worse in all rounds of the competition game compared to mono men, but 
the same is true for poly women compared to poly men7. Either mono women uniquely assume 
they will lose and consequently choose not to compete or there is an internal dynamic within 
households that influence female choice in opposite directions.  
                                               
5 The t-test comparing male and female education is significant at the 1% level. 
6 Difference in means is statistically different than 0 at the 1% level. 
7 T-tests confirm a statistically significant difference between scores for mono men and women and between scores 
for poly men and women. 
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Although average choice to compete is greater for poly subjects, the logit, linear 
probability, and random effects models show that there is no effect of being polygynous on choice 
to compete. As such, we can conclude that polygynous subjects are not more competitive than 
monogamous subjects as a result of their marriage structure, but that mono women are less 
competitive as a result of their marriage structure. We can rule out education and wealth as 
intermediaries because education differential does not affect poly choice to compete. Moreover, 
our subpopulation estimations show that less wealth for both mono subjects and women lead to 
greater competition, not lesser. 
6.2 Cooperation 
 6.2.a Stranger versus Spouse 
In the cooperation games we observe markedly different behavior between subjects and 
their spouses as compared to behavior regarding a stranger. All subject groups give preferential 
treatment to spouse on average. There is no difference between any of the subject groups in their 
choices regarding stranger for all four games. At a 99% confidence level, there is a 0.11 
percentage point increase in sharing with spouse over stranger for all subjects; 0.09 pp increase 
in costless sharing with spouse; a 0.30 pp decrease in costless envy with spouse; and a 0.29 pp 
decrease in envy with spouse.  
6.2.b Mono versus Poly 
We cannot conclude that mono households share more than poly households. Poly and 
mono subjects differ in terms of mean sharing with spouse, but the difference is not significant. 
Hence, our results show that mono and poly households share with spouse at statistically equal 
rates. This challenges recent experimental results from Nigeria that employs a public goods 
game to examine household efficiency. Poly subjects selected to keep more endowment for 
themselves as compared to mono subjects, thereby contributing less to the household pot and 
forgoing the opportunity to double the common pot reward (Barr et al., 2018). This experiment 
made the case internal dynamics within poly households in Western Nigeria sacrifice overall 
efficiency for personal gain, which could be a contributing factor in diminished outcomes for 
household members. In our experiment, by contrast, poly choice to share equates mono choice, 
which implicitly demonstrates poly subjects’ endorsement the resource allocation arrangement 
of the husband-wife arrangement.  
This conclusion is further evinced by the results of the costless envy. Poly subjects accept 
inequality for the opportunity to bring resources into the household. This cannot be said for 
 33 
mono households. While mono and poly men are statistically equal in their costless envy, mono 
women are .14 pp more (costless) envious than poly women. In this way, mono women are 
sabotaging the household’s ability to achieve efficiency, which is a completely novel result given 
the available literature comparing mono and poly subjects. 
Further testimony of monogamous inefficiency is found in the results of the behavior 
analysis. With lower commitment to maximizing and higher allegiance to egalitarianism, mono 
households are sacrificing resources available to the household. Mono men in particular lead in  
egalitarianism, meaning they too are sabotaging household efficiency more so than their poly 
counterparts. 
6.3.c Conditional Cooperation 
There are some interesting patterns in the relationship between wealth and cooperative 
game choices with respect to spouse. Less wealth is linked to more sharing when the total sum 
of money is the same for either choice (as in the sharing game). When the total sum is less for 
one of the choices (the unequal allocation for costless sharing), subjects prefer the choice with the 
larger total sum (i.e. the equal allocation in costless sharing). Less wealth is linked to more 
costless sharing for mono men only. Mono women are costless sharing at about 80% anyway, 
regardless of wealth. 
In the costless envy game, more wealth is associated with more envy for poly and mono 
men, but not women. In envy, the wealth variable is insignificant for all groups. This is could be 
because the total potential earnings are so much more for both individuals that all subjects are 
disinclined to forego the added money. This leads us to believe that male subjects are 
conditionally cooperative: as long as the payoffs are high enough (as in the envy game), they will 
optimize for the spouse. Below a certain threshold, they prefer the equal allocation. 
Mono women also exhibit conditional cooperation. The combined game results, in 
conjunction with covariates, indicate that mono women take steps to avoid resource accumulation 
below a certain threshold of payment. After a high enough reward is offered, they opt for the 
highest payoff. This may explain why certain outcomes depend on wealth status (costless envy) 
and others do not (envy). In particular, less wealthy mono women tend towards the generous 
behavior type, perhaps because poorer subjects will more frequently maximize whereas wealthier 
subjects will only maximize above a certain threshold. Recall that mono women compete less, 
independent of their wealth status. This could be because the earnings in that experiment were 
below the threshold, in which case, they prefer to minimize. But a one unit increase in wealth for 
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mono women generates a 0.11 pp increase in the probability of being egalitarian, a resource 
burner.  
6.3 Male Choice and Behavior towards Spouse 
Male choice in games (competition, sharing, costless sharing, envy) and in behavior 
(generous, selfish) are statistically indistinguishable. Despite the differences in marriage 
structure, resources, education, and culture, mono and poly men do not diverge much in terms of 
game choice and behavior type. Poly men are less selfish towards their wives, they are less 
egalitarian, and more resource maximizing. All of these choices are highly correlated with 
possessing less wealth. As previously discussed, poly households have the same amount of wealth 
as mono households but resources are divided between more people. We can assume there is 
more financial strain and stress related to resources in the poly household. If mono and poly men 
otherwise behave similarly except with respect to decisions dictated by resource acquisition, then 
their divergence can be explained by a disparity in wealth.  
6.4 Female Choice and Behavior towards Spouse 
 In contrast to men, mono and poly women are more dissimilar. Poly women compete 
more with spouse than mono women but they are also more generous and maximize resources 
much more frequently. Mono women, on the other hand, burn more resources for the household 
by competing less, cooperating conditionally, and favoring egalitarian allocation with spouse. 
The following section examines these differences and posits explanations for such behavior based 
on the cultural and economic context. 
6.4.a Monogamous Women 
 In this analyses, monogamous women emerge as a special subpopulation. Their choices, 
behavior, and extent to which control variables influence their decisions are noticeably different 
across the various games.  Mono women systematically choose the resource burning options 
more often than their poly counterparts in the cooperation games and they compete less than 
poly women against spouse, but in competition against a stranger, they compete as much as poly 
women. Poorer mono women tend towards the resource maximizing options while wealthier 
women only do so once the payoff exceeds a certain threshold. As such, they conditionally 
cooperate by maximizing resources with spouse when the payoff is high enough, and forgo 
resources otherwise. Evinced by these strategic differences in behavior, we can say with certainty 
that monogamous women are tactical in their choices and weigh the costs and benefits to wealth 
to wealth accumulation and inequality.  
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Are monogamous women competing less or polygynous women competing more? It 
could be that polygyny makes a woman more competitive, or monogamy makes a woman less 
competitive. We assume that polygyny is only self-selecting less than 50% of the time because 
approximately half of all poly women are monogamous when they chose to marry. That is to say, 
some unknown proportion of the monogamous population will become poly in the future, so 
presumably there is nothing different about the women married to Muslim men before polygyny8. 
Our data cannot uncover the true motivation, but we can conclude that there is something about 
the marriage structure which motivates mono and poly women in opposite directions in 
competition towards spouse. 
Taken in aggregate, mono women burn the most resources and compete less against 
spouse, thereby eliminating the possibility of doubling their earnings. These behaviors lend 
support to the theory that mono women are in a unique position as compared to the other 
subpopulations. Mono women are the only subjects whose future household is both uncertain 
and out of their control. Some unknown portion of mono couples will become polygynous. This 
choice is dependent on a man’s preference for polygyny and the accumulation of greater 
household wealth. There is some evidence from our survey data that this is an aspiration for some 
mono men and would not be preferred by 97% of our mono women subjects (Table 46).  Due to 
their unique position and their known anxiety about a polygynous future, women may be trying 
to limit the resources coming into the mono household or maintain a steady level of bargaining 
power in order to stave off a polygynous future. This is not a conclusive interpretation of the 
data but a theory based on experimental results and combined with the cultural context that 
requires further investigation. 
 6.4.b Polygynous Women 
  
Does polygyny foster competition in women? As previously discussed, the propensity to 
compete could be related to wealth for poly women. On average they have more children and 
total household resources are divided between more people in the poly household. Poly women 
could be attracted to the opportunity to double the prize. Their level of competitiveness combined 
with their other resource maximizing efforts across the games corroborate the theory that 
conditions related to polygyny foster competition in women. Consistent with the literature and 
evinced by the significant coefficient on the children variable in the panel estimation, those 
                                               
8 In Sierra Leone, most polygynous men are Muslim. 
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conditions are directly linked to total resources (material and emotional) available to the poly 
woman and their children. 
Recent research into west African polygyny links the financial strain experienced by 
polygynous households to male behavior and demonstrates improved conditions for poly women 
as a result of greater household income (Heath et al., 2018). If similar circumstances exist for our 
sample of poly women, we would expect them to maximize for themselves and husband. This is 
exactly what we see: preferential treatment for themselves and their husbands as compared to a 
stranger. The Heath et al. study saw no treatment effect for mono households, which could help 
to explain why our monogamous sample was less concerned with resource maximization.  
6.5 Co-wife Competition 
Choice to compete in the game is an expression of actual competitiveness within the 
household, rather than simply a monetary calculation based on personal wealth. Recall that 
polygynous women in aggregate compete equally with stranger, co-wife, and spouse. But when 
the sample is divided by wife rank, we observe heightened competition from junior wives towards 
senior wives. Choice to compete with stranger and spouse are equal between junior and senior 
wives, but the game against co-wife unviels the bifurcation in wife rank. If poly women were 
more competitive simply as a result of their resource status, or as a result of their younger average 
age, then we would expect to see equal rates of competition with all opponents. Instead we see 
more competition from junior wives towards senior wives and no one else, which lends support 
to the experiment as a predictor of competitive household dynamics as widely documented 
throughout the literature. 
Junior wives compete more with senior wives as a result of their status within the house. 
T-tests show that mean education, confidence, and likelihood of winning are all equal between 
first and second wives, and although there is an age differential, first and second wives show 
equal competitiveness towards other opponents. A t-test of number of children show that second 
wives have fewer children than first wives (2.46 compared to 3.55). Fewer children but higher 
competitiveness among junior wives therefore identifies wife rank as determinant of competition. 
This result is consistent with the Kazianga & Klonner (2006) study that empirically exposed the 
disadvantages faced by junior wives and their children. 
6.6 Co-wife Cooperation 
The results give an unambiguous affirmation of co-wife conflict. Aside from the 
competition game results, the behavior analysis reveals sharp divisions in willingness to 
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cooperate with spouse versus co-wife. There are stark declines in resource maximizing and 
generosity, both of which are associated with disadvantageous inequality but greater total 
resources for the household. We even see a resurrection of the spiteful behavior type, which is 
used almost exclusively among and for co-wives. Spite entails selecting the lower amount of 
money for the receiver, even at the peril of the sender. Over 20% of poly women acted with spite 
in the cooperation games, which is 15% over spite towards stranger according to the panel 
estimation. Survey data confirms that tension that exists between cowives (Figure 46 in the 
Appendix). On a 1-5 scale, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest, 50% of co-wives 
report friendship and sisterhood at 1, “rarely”. The other 50% report a 2, “sometimes.” These 
selections were evenly split between first and second wives. Options 3-5 did not receive a single 
selection over our entire poly female sample. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 The logit and linear probability estimates do not support the notion that the condition of 
polygyny is highly influential in these games. Although we see an initial effect in many of games 
and behavior types, controls routinely absorb much of the variation across marriage types. There 
are some notable exceptions. Poly subjects are both more (men) and less (women) selfish than 
mono subjects. Poly women are more resource maximizing and more generous than mono 
women in these estimates and act with less costless envy towards spouse compared to mono 
women. Poly women are more competitive with spouse than are mono women. 
On average, all subjects demonstrate an allegiance to their spouse as compared to 
stranger. Male behavior is similar across the marriage types. Divergence between mono and poly 
men revolve around wealth. Poly men maximize resources, and mono men lead in egalitarianism. 
In contrast to many of the existing accounts of polygyny, poly men give exactly equal treatment 
to first and second wife. 
Are monogamous women competing less or polygynous women competing more? The 
propensity to compete could be a matter of wealth for poly women, as previously discussed, since 
the competition experiment offered the chance to double the prize. At the same time, we assume 
that polygyny is only self-selecting less than 50% of the time because approximately half of all 
poly women are monogamous when they chose to marry. Some unknown proportion of the 
monogamous population will become poly in the future. The unique position of these currently 
mono women may be reflected in their competition-avoidant, wealth-reducing behavior. They 
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waste resources in order to achieve egalitarianism with husband. Their monetary choices reflect 
conditional cooperation as they are willing to forgo small amounts cash but take the large 
amounts.  
The myth of the efficient monogamous household has been dispelled. The results did not 
convey a story of greater household efficiency among mono subjects. In comparison to poly 
spouses, mono subjects in our sample more frequently selected the less monetarily advantageous 
options and missed opportunities to maximize for the household. In fact, 70% of mono subjects 
are not maximizers compared to less than 50% of poly subjects. In contrast to the vast literature 
that portrays poly people as serially selfish, this research finds that they act with the decisive 
desire to acquire. Monogamous households are the perpetrators of inefficiency. Nonetheless, their 
preference for the equal allocation is also loudly expressed. We are unable to discern whether 
this preference is rooted in the values of egalitarianism or in an aversion to disadvantageous 
inequality. 
Poly women, on the other hand, are first driven by resource maximization and then 
generosity when it comes to cooperating with spouse, but not with co-wife.  They trade resource 
maximizing and generosity for spite and selfishness. Co-wives burn resources in order to burn 
each other. Less wealth is associated with more generosity toward spouse, but it is associated 
with more spitefulness toward co-wife. If poly women are willing to forgo, and even hurt 
themselves, in order to disadvantage their co-wife, then their willingness to maximize with 
spouse must be rooted in the spirit of cooperation. Junior wives, being perhaps the most 
disadvantaged in the poly household, intensify their competitiveness with co-wife alone.  We 
believe this reflects actual competitive dynamics because a purely monetary motivation should 
produce more competition with stranger and spouse. 
The results of this study can help to inform effective programming that targets the poor 
in different marriage contexts. This study gives context related to the distribution of benefits, 
such as cash transfers or entitlements. If benefits are distributed to the legal spouse alone, our 
results predict that junior wives and their children will be disadvantaged, as sharing is not likely 
to occur at least 20% of the time between poly women. Furthermore, mono women may not see 
cash transfers or benefits at all if it results in disadvantageous inequality for their husbands. 
Therefore, in order to ensure the most efficient distribution of benefits, they should be 
administered to women directly or through channels that give everyone equal opportunity to 
benefit. 
 39 
Recognizing that polygyny is now a deeply rooted cultural tradition as well as an adaptive 
response to challenging economic conditions, the focus of policy should not be suppressing the 
practice. Increasing economic opportunities for society as a whole would address many of the 
underlying problems in any marriage structure. Focusing efforts on empowering women by 
providing education, jobs, child assistance, and capital would raise the prospects for women and 
their children so that they may have more choices outside of a marriage arrangement to gain 
agency over their own lives. 
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8. Appendix 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
This study takes place in the two shaded regions. 
 
Appendix B 
 
RISK ACTIVITY 
Select One Lottery 
Lottery 1 
Successful 
12,000 Leones 
 
Failed 
12,000 Leones 
Lottery 4 
Successful 
20,000 Leones 
 
Failed 
5000 Leones 
 
 
(DHS, 2013) 
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Lottery 2 
Successful 
15,000 Leones 
 
Failed 
10,000 Leones 
Lottery 5 
Successful 
22,000 Leones 
 
Failed 
2000 Leones 
Lottery 3 
 Successful 
17,000 Leones 
 
Failed 
7000 Leones 
Lottery 6 
 Successful 
25,000 Leones 
 
Failed 
0 Leones 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Enumerator Work Sheet for Each Subject
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Appendix D 
 
Supplemental Materials 
 
Experimental Instructions (https://tinyurl.com/y3fmp8wx) 
Enumerator Script (https://tinyurl.com/yxfsnn2e) 
Survey (https://tinyurl.com/y32fcqwf) 
Dataset (https://tinyurl.com/y3he6r9t) 
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Table 19: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Poly Women
Dependent Variable: Choice in Game with Stranger/Spouse/Co-Wife
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Sharing Costless Sharing Costless Envy Envy
Treatment1 0.07** 0.07** 0.08** Treatment1 0.01 0.00 -0.00 Treatment1 -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.11*** Treatment1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(Co-Wife) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (Co-Wife) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (Co-Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (Co-Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Treatment2 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** Treatment2 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09** Treatment2 -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.36*** Treatment2 -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.24***
(Husband) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (Husband) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (Husband) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (Husband) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wealth -0.46*** -0.49*** Wealth -0.12 -0.12 Wealth 0.15 0.14 Wealth -0.08 -0.08
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Makeni -0.25** -0.13 Makeni -0.19** -0.18* Makeni -0.26*** -0.17 Makeni -0.29*** -0.17
(0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Education 0.01 0.01 Education 0.01 0.01 Education -0.00 0.00 Education 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Children -0.00 -0.01 Children 0.01 0.02 Children 0.00 0.00 Children 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Mende -0.20** -0.12 Mende -0.17** -0.15* Mende -0.13 -0.01 Mende -0.19** -0.05
(0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Temne -0.06 -0.07 Temne 0.03 0.03 Temne -0.03 -0.01 Temne -0.03 -0.00
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Age 0.01* Age -0.00 Age -0.00 Age 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.51*** 0.93*** 0.67*** Constant 0.75*** 0.90*** 0.95*** Constant 0.71*** 0.85*** 0.75*** Constant 0.51*** 0.76*** 0.57***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.16) (0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.03) (0.09) (0.14) (0.03) (0.09) (0.14)
Observations 648 648 601 Observations 647 647 600 Observations 648 648 601 Observations 648 648 601
N 224 224 208 N 224 224 208 N 224 224 208 N 224 224 208
Table 20: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Mono Women
Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse/Co-Wife
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Sharing Costless Sharing Costless Envy Envy
Treatment2 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** Treatment2 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** Treatment2 -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18*** Treatment2 -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.24***
(Husband) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (Husband) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (Husband) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (Husband) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Wealth -0.15 -0.14 Wealth -0.22 -0.25 Wealth 0.32** 0.29* Wealth 0.21 0.16
(0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Makeni 0.12 0.17 Makeni 0.10 0.13 Makeni 0.05 0.05 Makeni 0.10 0.12
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Education -0.01 -0.00 Education 0.01 0.02 Education 0.00 0.00 Education 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Children -0.02 -0.04 Children -0.04* -0.05* Children -0.01 -0.01 Children -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Mende 0.13 0.14 Mende 0.09 0.09 Mende 0.18 0.16 Mende 0.29* 0.28
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Temne -0.13 -0.13 Temne 0.01 0.01 Temne -0.11 -0.11 Temne -0.14 -0.14
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Age 0.01 Age 0.00 Age -0.00 Age 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.33*** 0.36 0.12 Constant 0.63*** 0.72*** 0.58** Constant 0.86*** 0.71*** 0.74*** Constant 0.83*** 0.64*** 0.58**
(0.08) (0.23) (0.27) (0.07) (0.20) (0.24) (0.09) (0.21) (0.25) (0.08) (0.21) (0.25)
Observations 242 242 230 Observations 242 242 230 Observations 242 242 230 Observations 242 242 230
N 121 121 115 N 121 121 115 N 121 121 115 N 121 121 115
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Poly Men
Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Sharing Costless Sharing Costless Envy Envy
Treatment1 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** Treatment1 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** Treatment1 -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** Treatment1 -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29***
(1st Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1st Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1st Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1st Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Treatment2 0.09** 0.09** 0.09* Treatment2 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** Treatment2 -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.32*** Treatment2 -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.25***
(2nd Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (2nd Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (2nd Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (2nd Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wealth -0.47** -0.52*** Wealth -0.17 -0.17 Wealth 0.05 0.11 Wealth -0.17 -0.12
(0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Makeni -0.01 0.10 Makeni -0.04 -0.02 Makeni -0.15 -0.13 Makeni -0.08 -0.03
(0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Education -0.01 0.01 Education 0.01 0.01 Education -0.02 -0.02 Education 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Children -0.00 -0.02 Children 0.00 0.01 Children -0.02 -0.02* Children -0.01 -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mende 0.02 0.08 Mende -0.03 -0.01 Mende 0.02 0.04 Mende 0.00
(0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.00)
Temne 0.03 0.07 Temne 0.08 0.09 Temne -0.11 -0.10 Temne 0.00 0.05
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Age 0.01** Age -0.00 Age 0.00 Age -0.10 -0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant 0.54*** 0.73*** 0.32 Constant 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.73*** Constant 0.67*** 0.89*** 0.71*** Constant 0.51*** 0.75*** 0.49**
(0.05) (0.14) (0.24) (0.04) (0.11) (0.19) (0.05) (0.13) (0.21) (0.04) (0.13) (0.22)
Observations 320 320 305 Observations 319 319 304 Observations 318 318 303 Observations 320 320 305
N 108 108 103 N 108 108 103 N 108 108 103 N 108 108 103
Table 22: Random Effects Estimates of Cooperation Games for Mono Men
Dependent Variable: Choice in the Games with Stranger/Spouse
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Sharing Costless Sharing Costless Envy Envy
Treatment1 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* Treatment1 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** Treatment1 -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** Treatment1 -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26***
(Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (Wife) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Wealth -0.41** -0.45** Wealth -0.31** -0.35** Wealth 0.41*** 0.39** Wealth 0.24 0.27
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Makeni -0.21 -0.16 Makeni -0.04 0.02 Makeni -0.29* -0.26 Makeni -0.43** -0.46***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Education 0.05* 0.05 Education 0.02 0.01 Education 0.05* 0.04 Education 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Children 0.01 -0.00 Children -0.01 -0.03 Children -0.00 -0.01 Children -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mende -0.22 -0.20 Mende -0.09 -0.06 Mende 0.14 0.15 Mende -0.11 -0.13
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Temne -0.04 -0.05 Temne -0.13 -0.15 Temne 0.05 0.05 Temne 0.05 0.05
(0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Age 0.00 Age 0.01 Age 0.00 Age -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.50*** 0.78*** 0.63** Constant 0.63*** 0.87*** 0.70*** Constant 1.00*** 0.80*** 0.72*** Constant 0.85*** 0.94*** 1.04***
(0.08) (0.22) (0.25) (0.07) (0.20) (0.23) (0.08) (0.20) (0.24) (0.08) (0.22) (0.25)
Observations 240 240 238 Observations 240 240 238 Observations 240 240 238 Observations 240 240 238
N 120 120 119 N 120 120 119 N 120 120 119 N 120 120 119
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 39: Table 40: Linear Probability Estimates 
Logit Estimates for Competition Game for Competition Game 
by Wife Rank by Wife Rank
Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Co-Wife Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Co-Wife
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Poly Women Poly Women
First Wife -0.07 -0.12* -0.13** -0.13**
First Wife -0.28 -0.56* -0.82** -0.79** (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
(0.28) (0.31) (0.37) (0.38) Wealth -0.23 -0.08 -0.13
Wealth -0.99 -0.43 -0.65 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
(0.72) (0.91) (0.93) Makeni 0.11 -0.04 0.06
Makeni 0.51 -0.21 0.27 (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
(0.60) (0.70) (0.80) Education 0.13*** 0.07* 0.08**
Education 0.63*** 0.34 0.37 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(0.20) (0.23) (0.23) Children 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Children 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.35*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(0.09) (0.11) (0.13) Temne -0.14 -0.12 -0.11
Temne -0.65 -0.74 -0.64 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
(0.49) (0.55) (0.58) Mende -0.20* -0.15 -0.07
Mende -0.88* -0.98 -0.54 (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
(0.52) (0.61) (0.71) Risk 0.01 0.01
Risk 0.08 0.06 (0.02) (0.02)
(0.10) (0.10) Likelihood of Winning 0.05** 0.04**
Likelihood of Winning 0.23** 0.21** (0.02) (0.02)
(0.10) (0.10) Confidence 0.06*** 0.06***
Confidence 0.36*** 0.38*** (0.02) (0.02)
(0.13) (0.13) Age 0.00
Age -0.00 (0.00)
(0.02) Constant 0.60*** 0.51*** 0.21* 0.13
Constant 0.39* 0.02 -1.56** -1.80 (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19)
(0.20) (0.56) (0.73) (1.11)
Observations 214 214 214 198
Observations 214 214 214 198 R-squared 0.00 0.13 0.31 0.32
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 41: Random Effects Estimates Table 42: Random Effects Estimates
 for Competition Game  for Competition Game 
by Wife Rank by Wife Rank
Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Spouse/Co-Wife Dependent Variable: Choice to Compete Against Stranger/Co-Wife
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st Wife 1st Wife 1st Wife 1st Wife 2nd Wife 2nd Wife 2nd Wife 2nd Wife 1st Wife 1st Wife 1st Wife 1st Wife 2nd Wife 2nd Wife 2nd Wife 2nd Wife
Treatment1 0.07** 0.07** 0.08** 0.06** Treatment1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1st Wife) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (1st Wife) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Treatment2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 Treatment2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(2nd Wife) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (2nd Wife) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Wealth -0.20 -0.08 -0.12 -0.20 -0.08 -0.12 Wealth -0.25 -0.07 -0.16 -0.23 -0.12 -0.14
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19)
Makeni 0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.01 Makeni 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.20 -0.07 0.01
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18)
Education 0.14*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.14*** 0.08** 0.08** Education 0.17*** 0.10* 0.09* 0.12** 0.07 0.09*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Children 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04** Children 0.05*** 0.04** 0.04** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Mende -0.19* -0.13 -0.06 -0.19* -0.13 -0.06 Mende -0.20 -0.10 -0.06 -0.16 -0.21* -0.13
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
Temne -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 Temne -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
Risk 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 Risk 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04* 0.04 0.06*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Confidence 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** Confidence 0.05* 0.05** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.00 0.00 Age -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant 0.55*** 0.45*** 0.15 0.04 0.53*** 0.42*** 0.12 0.00 Constant 0.53*** 0.43*** 0.12 0.16 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.06 -0.06
(0.03) (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.03) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.05) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.05) (0.16) (0.14) (0.22)
Observations 435 435 435 403 435 435 435 403 Observations 221 221 221 205 209 209 209 193
N 224 224 224 208 224 224 224 208 N 110 110 110 102 105 105 105 97
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Co-Wife Analysis 
Likelihood of Winning Likelihood of Winning
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Table 46      Figure 46 
  
 
 
 
Figures 47-51  
  
  
Under ideal conditions, how many wives would you like your husband to have?
Poly Women Mono Women
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 189 83.38 118 97.52
2 11 4.19 1 0.83
3 2 0.89
4 2 0.89
6 16 7.14
8 4 1.79
No Response 2 1.65
Under ideal conditions, how many wives would you like to have?
Poly Men Mono Men
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 6 5.56 105 86.78
2 77 71.3 12 9.92
3 18 16.67 3 2.48
4 1 0.93
6 4 3.7
No Response 2 1.85 1 0.83
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